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CONSUMER REPOSSESSIONS AND DEFICIENCIES:
NEW PERSPECTIVES FROM NEW DATA I
MARTIN B. WHITE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year in the United States upwards of half a million automobiles are
repossessed from consumers who purchased them on credit.' Following
repossession, these automobiles are ordinarily sold by the repossessing creditor
or by a car dealer to whom the creditor has assigned his rights in the collateral. 2
If the price obtained for the collateral is inadequate to extinguish the pur-
chaser's debt, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), 3 permits
the repossessing creditor, or an assignee of his rights, to collect the resulting
deficiency from the debtor. 4
Between 1969 and 1975, several empirical studies of automobile reposses-
sion sales and deficiencies were reported.' These studies were based on court
records of lawsuits to recover deficiencies. The studies indicated that deficien-
cies were often caused by the sale of repossessed automobiles at substantially
t Copyright	 1982 by Boston College Law School.
* A.B., Columbia University, 1971; J.D., University of Michigan, 1974, Attorney,
Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Consumer Protection. The views expressed in this article
are those of the author and should not be attributed to the FTC or the Bureau of Consumer Pro-
tection. The author would like to thank John Zaimes, Joseph Karger, and Stuart Wessler who
assisted in compiling and analyzing the data on which this article is based, and Philip Shuchman
and Jon Jerison who read an earlier draft. Remaining errors and infelicities are the responsibility
of the author.
' This author estimated the number in 1977 at 650,000. Federal Trade Commission,
Bureau of Consumer Protection, STAFF REPORT ON TRADE REGULATION RULE CONCERNING
CREDIT PRACTICES (1980) [hereinafter cited as FTC CREDIT PRACTICES STAFF REPORT] at 260
n.25. See also White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 WIS. L.
REV. 503, 514 n.41 (approximately 1,000,000 repossessions per year). The precise number
presumably fluctuates from year to year depending on economic conditions.
2 See text at notes 28-29 infra.
Article 9 is the basic law governing security interests in all states except Louisiana.
Approximately twenty states have passed laws governing consumer transactions that are more
restrictive than the U.C.C. with respect to the rights of the creditor following repossessions. See
FTC CREDIT PRACTICES STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 254-57. These laws restrict the creditor's
right to a deficiency, discussed below. Most such laws are confined to sales finance, as opposed to
loan, transactions. In addition, most of these laws apply only to transactions under a specified
dollar value (typically $1,000), and therefore do not apply to most automobile sales. Id.
U.C.C. 9-504(2) (1972). See text and notes at notes 10-22 infra for a fuller discus-
sion of the law.
Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 20 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Shuchman]; Note, Business As Usual: An Empirical Study of
Automobile Deficiency judgments Suits in the District of Columbia, 3 CONN. L. REV. 511 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Firmin & Simpson]; Note, I Can Get It For You Wholesale: The Lingering Problem
of Automobile Deficiency Judgments, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Corenswetl;
see also Enstrom, Kill the Automobile Deficiency Judgment, 56 A.B.A.J. 364 (1970).
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less than book wholesale value. 6 The authors of the studies thus concluded that
the U.C.C. did not function satisfactorily in the context of consumer
automobile sales.'
This article analyzes a new source of data concerning repossession sales,
which has become available in connection with the Federal Trade Commission
rulemaking proceeding on the Commission's proposed Credit Practices trade
regulation rule. 9 The new data have important advantages over that previously
available, and give a more complete picture of the marketing of repossessed
vehicles and the factors that determine deficiencies. The new data demonstrate
that a distinction must be drawn between repossession sales made directly by
creditors and those made by car dealers as a result of recourse arrangements. 9
The results of the earlier studies are accurate for repossession sales by
See Table 2 In text or note 51 infra.
' Shuchman, supra note 5, at 48-57; Firmin & Simpson, supra note 5, at 531-32; Cor-
enswet, supra note 5, at 1099-1103.
8 Proposed 16 C.F.R. Part 444. The data on which this article is based were assembled
by the author and his colleagues in connection with the proceeding. During the early 1970's, the
FTC undertook a number of investigations of automobile repossession practices. See, e.g.,
material on record of FTC Credit Practices Rulemaking, Record 215-42 [hereinafter cited as
FTC Credit Practices Record] at R-XI-70. These investigations led to the incorporation of a provi-
sion deficiencies in the Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Credit Practices which the FTC pro-
posed in 1975, Proposed 16 C.F.R. $ 444.2(a)(7), 40 Fed. Reg. 16347 (1975). A revised version
of the proposed rule can be found in the FTC CREDIT PRACTICES STAFF REPORT, supra note 1,
at Appendix A. As of January, 1982 the FTC had not yet taken final action on the rule. The
repossession investigations also led to litigation by the Commission against the three major
domestic automobile manufacturers, their finace subsidiaries, and selected automobile dealers.
Chrysler Motors Corp., et al., Dkt. 9072; Ford Motor Co., et al., 93 F.T.C. 402 (1979); General
Motors Corp., et al., 95 F.T.C. 825 (1980). All but one of the respondents settled with the FTC.
Opinions in the remaining suit can be found in Ford Motor Co., et al., 94 F.T.C. 564 (1979),
vacated, Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 654 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1981). The litigation focused on failure
to return surpluses generated when repossessed automobiles were sold for a price greater than the
balance owed by the debtor at the time of repossession. The FTC investigations, rulemaking,
and litigation generated a large amount of quantitative and other information concerning
repossession sales. Much of this information has been placed in the FTC Credit Practices Record
and serves as the basis for the analysis presented here.
One secondary purpose of this article is to call attention to the FTC Credit Practices
Record as a source of data for research on many aspects of consumer credit. The proposed Credit
Practices rule contains about a dozen provisions dealing with various' creditor remedies and col-
lection practices, including confessions of judgment, waivers of property exemptions, wage
assignments, blanket security interests in household goods, cross-collateral security interests, late
fees, attorneys fee clauses, debt collection contacts with persons other than the delinquent debtor,
and the use of cosigners. While the record focuses on these practices, it contains material relevant
to many other aspects of the consumer credit industry. An overview of the types of material on
the record can be found in FTC CREDIT PRACTICES STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-60. The
FTC Credit Practices Record,.supra, is available for inspection at the FTC building in Washington,
D.C. Written material submitted for the record is referenced by a capital "R" followed by a
capitalized Roman numeral, followed by a number: e.g., R-XI-70. Hearing testimony is
referenced by a transcript page number: e.g., Tr. 875. Hearing exhibits are referenced by the let-
ters "HX" followed by a number: e.g., HX-204.
6 Recourse arrangements are discussed in the text and note at note 29 infra. The Cor-
enswet study, see text and notes at notes 40-60 infra, foreshadowed some of the results reported
here.
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creditors. Sales by dealers, however, produce significantly higher prices and
smaller deficiencies. The data examined in this article also shed light on a
number of other issues not addressed extensively in earlier studies, including
the condition of repossessed cars and its effect on sale prices.
This article will begin with a brief overview of the law concerning the
disposition of repossessed property set forth in Article 9 of the U.C.C. The ar-
ticle will then describe the market context within which the law governing defi-
ciencies operates. This description will focus on the two major methods used by
creditors to handle repossessed automobiles, "recourse" and
"non-recourse"disposition, and will conclude with an estimate of their relative
importance in the market place. This discussion will provide the background
for a later comparison of the effects of different methods of disposition on the
amount of deficiencies owed by consumers.
After presenting the legal and economic framework within which deficien-
cies arise, the article discusses the results and limitations of earlier studies of
automobile repossession sales. The article next turns to an analysis of new data
on repossession sales, which present a substantially more complete picture of
the market than was available previously. The conclusions reached are then
tested against those of another recent analysis of similar data.
The concluding section of this article suggests some implications of the
empirical results for a number of proposals to reform the U.C.C. deficiency
mechanism. The proposal which appears in best light is one which would re-
quire deficiencies to be assessed based on the best possible price obtainable for
repossessed collateral. "Best possible price" for repossessed automobiles
would be rebuttably presumed to be the retail value. The presumption in favor
of retail value is supported by a finding that many repossessed automobiles are
currently retailed and that retail disposition produces smaller deficiencies than
other methods. At the same time, it is not clear that all repossessed automobiles
can be retailed, so the presumption should be rebuttable.
While the results presented have policy implications, this article does not
attempt a complete legal and economic analysis of the deficiency question. The
major purpose of this article is, rather, to present an empirical picture of ex-
isting practices under the U.C.C. that is more complete and nuanced than that
which appeared previously. Such a picture takes into account both the
repossession sales at less than wholesale price reported by earlier studies and
the retail sales which occur in a large number of repossessions. Whatever policy
conclusions are reached, future consideration of the deficiencies issue should
take into account both aspects of the market's response to U.C.C. Article 9.
II. U.C.C. ARTICLE 9 AND THE DISPOSITION OF
REPOSSESSED COLLATERAL
The rights of the debtor and creditor following repossession of collateral
are governed by sections 9-504 through 9-507 of the U.C.C. This article will
not attempt a full discussion of the law governing repossession, a subject which
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has been treated extensively elsewhere.'° A brief outline of the law under the
U.C.C. is presented, however, to provide a context for the empirical informa-
tion on repossession discussed below.
Following repossession, but prior to any resale by the creditor, the debtor
has the right to buy back or "redeem" the collateral. U.C.C. section 9-506
gives the debtor the right to do so by "tendering fulfillment of all obligations
secured by the collateral ... " including expenses reasonably incurred by the
secured party in connection with the repossession. If the collateral is redeemed,
the issue of a deficiency will, of course, not arise. It is commonly assumed,
however, that the right to redeem repossessed collateral is rarely exercised in
consumer transactions." Since credit contracts typically contain acceleration
clauses, redemption is likely to require payment of the entire outstanding
balance." The occurrence of default and repossession, however, implies that
the debtor's resources are inadequate to maintain monthly payments on the
debt. It is therefore unlikely that the debtor will be able to pay off the entire
balance upon repossession.
In the event that redemption does not occur, U.C.C. sections 9-504 and
9-505 give the creditor two options regarding the disposition of the collateral.
Under section 9-504, the creditor is entitled to sell the collateral to satisfy the
underlying debt. Section 9-504(1) states that:
...The proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the order follow-
ing to
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale
or lease, selling ... and the like and, to the extent provided for in
the agreement and not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorneys'
fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest
under which the disposition is made;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate
security interest in the collateral . .
If the proceeds from the sale are inadequate both to cover expenses and satisfy
the underlying indebtedness, "the debtor is liable for any deficiency."t 3 If the
net proceeds more than satisfy the debt, "the secured party must account to the
debtor for any surplus . ." 14 Section 9-504 gives the creditor almost com-
plete freedom to determine how the collateral will be sold, subject to the re-
quirement that "every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner,
time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable." 15
10 E.g., Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure and Deficiency: A Journey to the Underworld
and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REV. 302 (1972). See also note 5 supra.
" Id. at 315.
12 Id.
13 	S 9-504(2). This is true unless the parties agree otherwise. Id.
14 Id.
15 U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
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As an alternative to a sale of the collateral pursuant to section 9-504, sec-
tion 9-505 authorizes the repossessing creditor, with the permission of the debt-
or, to keep the collateral in full satisfaction of the debt. 16 This approach is often
called "strict foreclosure." The repossession is treated as extinguishing all
rights and duties of the debtor with regard to the transaction. It is likely that
section 9-505 is something of a dead letter in consumer transactions. From the
creditor's viewpoint, the only major advantage of section 9-505 over section
9-504 is that under section 9-505 there is no duty to return surpluses." It is
commonly assumed, however, that surpluses virtually never appear in con-
sumer repossessions.' 8 Creditors are thus unlikely to perceive much advantage
in proceeding under section 9-505.
While repossession sales by creditors rarely result in surpluses,'° reposses-
sion sales by car dealers sometimes do result in such a credit being due the debt-
or. 20 When surpluses are obtained, however, they are rarely returned to con-
sumers. 2 ' Thus, even when surpluses do result, there is little incentive to make
use of the section 9-505 procedure. It is possible that recent FTC litigation con-
cerning surpluses will lead to a greater use of section 9-505, if only by increas-
ing awareness of the existence of surpluses."
The U.C.C., then, provides three major alternatives in the event of
repossession. First, the debtor has the option, in theory at least, to redeem the
property by tendering payment in full of both all obligations secured by the col-
16 If the collateral is consumer goods and the debtor has paid sixty percent of the cash
price of the collateral, or sixty percent of he amount of the secured loan, § 9-505(1) requires sale
of the collateral pursuant to § 9-504 unless the creditor, after default, obtains written authoriza-
tion from the debtor not to do so. In other situations the creditor must merely notify the debtor
(and, for collateral that is not consumer goods, other persons with a security interest in the col-
lateral) of his intention to retain the collateral, The creditor may proceed to do this if he has
received no written objection within twenty-one days. U.C.C. § 9-505(2).
17 But see J. WEIITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 977.98 (1st ed. 1972). These authors suggest that the ability to sell collateral
without worry that the sale will be legally challenged by the debtor is an important advantage of §
9-505.
18 See, e.g., Davis, Legislative Restriction of Creditor Powers and Remedies: A Case Study of the
Negotiation and Drafting of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 72 MICH. L. REV. 3, 56 (1973); Firmin &
Simpson, supra note 5, at 514 n.21.
19 E.g., Ford Motor Co., et al, (Initial Decision), 94 F.T.C. 564, 578 (1979) (sum-
marizing trial testimony by creditors).
20 See text and notes at note 86 infra.
21 See Complaint Counsel's Trial Brief in Ford Motor Co., et al,, 94 F.T.C. 564,
565-66 (1979); and Complaint Counsel's Trial Brief in General Motors Corp., et al., 95 F.T.C.
825, 829 (1980). Allegations in the trial briefs are based on subpoenas of numerous car dealers.
22 This litigation includes Chrysler Motor Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 9072; Ford Motor Co.,
et al., 93 F.T.C. 402 (1979); General Motors Corp., et al., 95 F.T.C. 825 (1980). The FTC
order in the Ford litigation would restrict the use of § 9-505 by car dealers to limited cir-
cumstances, out of concern that § 9-505 otherwise would be used routinely to avoid returning
surpluses to consumers. Ford Motor Co., et al,, 94 F.T.C. 564, 640. See also Commission's Opin-
ion, id. at 625-27. The Commission's decision in the case has been vacated by the Ninth Circuit
on other grounds relating to questions of administrative law. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 654 F.2d
599 (9th Cir. 1981).
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lateral, and any reasonable expenses incurred by the creditor in connection
with the repossession. In the likely event that redemption does not occur, the
creditor may proceed in one of two other ways. Under section 9-504 of the
Code, the creditor is entitled to sell the collateral to satisfy the underlying debt.
Should the proceeds from the sale prove insufficient to satisfy the indebtedness,
the debtor remains liable for the amount of the deficiency. Conversely, should
the proceeds from the sale exceed the amount of indebtedness, the Code re-
quires the resulting surplus to be paid to the debtor. Under section 9-505, the
creditor, if authorized by the debtor, may keep the collateral in full satisfaction
of the debt, with no obligation to return any surplus to the debtor. In practice,
however, most creditors proceed under section 9-504 and sell the repossessed
property to satisfy the underlying debt. As a result, a typical debtor whose car
has been repossessed faces the prospect of a deficiency or surplus based on the
outcome of a section 9-504 sale.
III. THE AUTOMOBILE FINANCE MARKET AND ITS
EFFECT ON THE DISPOSITION OF REPOSSESSIONS
Credit to finance automobiles accounts for about one-third of all consumer
credit. 23 Automobile credit takes two major forms. About 40% is extended in
the form of a direct loan to the purchaser." The primary sources of such loans
are banks and credit unions. 25
 The other 60% of automobile credit is initially
extended by car dealers via retail installment contracts." These contracts are
then sold either to banks or to a finance company subsidiary of the automobile
manufacturer." Credit extended by banks or finance companies in this man-
ner is often called "indirect credit."
The form of financing can have an important effect on the disposition of
the collateral after repossession. When vehicles are financed by direct loans,
the lender ordinarily has responsibility for repossession and sale of collateral.
The lender also has the right to a deficiency if one results from the sale. The
bank or finance company is similarly responsible for repossession and sale in
about half of all indirectly financed transactions. In these transactions, once the
installment contract is assigned, the dealer who sold the automobile to the debt-
or has no further obligations or rights in connection with the credit extension.
Such indirectly financed transactions are called "without recourse" or "non-
23 At the end of 1980, automobile credit outstanding came to $116 billion. Total con-
sumer installment credit came to $313 billion. National Consumer Finance Association 1981
Finance Fads Yearbook [hereinafter cited as 1981 Finance Facts] at 45. The figures are from the
Federal Reserve Board and can also be found in the monthly Federal Reserve Bulletin at A42 (Oct.,
1981).
24 See Table 1 in text at note 36 infra.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 The subsidiaries are General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Ford Motor Credit
Company, and Chrysler Credit Corporation. These three firms account for the bulk of all
automobile financing by finance companies. 1981 Finance Facts, supra note 23, at 56.
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recourse" transactions because the assignee has no recourse against the dealer
in the event the car buyer defaults. 28
The remainder of indirect car finance transactions are on a recourse
basis." This article will use the term "recourse" to refer to a variety of con-
tractual arrangements under which car dealers agree to compensate indirect
creditors for losses suffered when car buyers default on their credit obligations.
Under the most common form of such an agreement the dealer is required to
"buy back" the contract from the creditor to whom it was assigned should
repossession occur." The dealer pays the creditor the amount due on the con-
tract and receives possession of the collateral." In addition, the dealer is
responsible for selling the collateral and has the right to collect any resulting
deficiency from the debtor, as well as the duty to return any resulting surplus. 32
Recourse agreements shift most of the risk of default to the car dealer, and
away from the creditor who provides the financing for the dealer's sales. In
return for bearing the default risk, recourse dealers generally receive a larger
share of the face value of the contracts they sell than do non-recourse dealers."
While recourse agreements are contracts between financers and dealers,
not between creditors and consumer debtors, they nevertheless have important
implications for such debtors. In repossessions subject to recourse, the sale
which determines the debtor's deficiency or surplus is likely to be made by a
car dealer." In non-recourse repossessions the sale will be made by a bank,
finance company, or credit union. As will be discussed in more detail below, 35
it is reasonable to suppose that a dealer will do a better job selling the collateral
than will a financer. This suggests that in a section 9-504 sale the consumer is
28 M. BURY, THE AUTOMOBILE DEALER 111 (5th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
BURY]. Bury prefers the term "non-repurchase." Id.
28
 According to a 1977 American Bankers Association survey, for various size classes of
banks the percentage of non-recourse paper varies from 40.3% to 60.8% , with larger banks
generally making greater use of non-recourse. American Bankers Association 1977 IN-
STALLMENT/CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT at 31. About half of the contracts purchased by
GMAC are subject to recourse. GMAC, FTC Credit Practices Record, supra note 8, R-I(a)-812 at 3.
In 1974 approximately 44% of FMCC retail paper was non-recourse. Letter from C.V. Burbach
of FMCC, dated June 6, 1975, FTC Credit Practices Record, supra note 8, R-XI-172 at 1.
3° The type of recourse arrangement described in the text is often called a repurchase
plan. See generally BURY, supra note 28, at 112-113, for a description of this and several other types
of recourse arrangements. Examples of recourse agreements can be found in Chrysler Credit Cor-
poration Operations Manual in the FTC Credit Practices Record, supra note 8, at R-XI-168.
The financer may assume responsibility for certain costs, for example repossession
expenses, or the cost of repairing uninsured collision damage. BURY, supra note 28, at 112-13.
" See note 34 infra.
" BURY, supra note 28, at 112-13.
'4 See U.C.C. 5 9-504(5), which states that a person who is liable to, and receives col-
lateral from, a secured creditor pursuant to a repurchase or similar agreement acquires the rights
and duties of the secured party. Section 9-504(5) also states that the transfer from the secured
creditor to the dealer pursuant to a repurchase agreement is not a sale for purpose of 59-504, im-
plying that the subsequent sale by the dealer is the one that will legally determine any deficiency
or surplus.
" See text and notes at notes 76-101 infra.
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apt to be assessed a smaller deficiency if the dealer is subject to a recourse
financing agreement.
As of the end of 1980, outstanding automobile credit in the United States
broke down approximately as stated in Table 1:
Table 1 36
Banks
Amount in Billion of
Dollars Outstanding
Percent
of Total
61.0 52
Direct Loans 26.2 23
Indirect Credit 34.8 30
Credit Unions (direct loans) 21.1 18
Finance Companies (indirect credit) 34.2 29
Total 116.3 100
Direct 47.3 40
Indirect 69.0 60
Since about half of all indirect automobile credit is on a recourse basis"
and 60% of all automobile credit is indirect," roughly 30% of automobile
credit is likely to be subject to recourse. Recourse transactions probably ac-
count for well over 30% of actual repossessions, however, since repossession
rates in indirectly financed transactions are several times as high as those for
direct loan sales." Thus, indirect transactions, which include recourse transac-
tions, account for a disproportionately large share of repossessions.
The above review of the automobile finance market indicates that in
something over 30% of all repossessions, the repossessing creditor does not
itself sell the collateral. Instead, the repossessed vehicle is turned over to the
original dealer for sale, pursuant to a recourse agreement. Thus, in a signifi-
38 1981 Finance Facts, supra note 23, at 45 (based on Federal Reserve Board figures).
" See note 29 supra.
38 See Table 1 in text at note 36 supra.
38 In the United States during 1969-1977, banks' monthly repossession rates averaged
.76 per 1000 loans for direct credit and 2.4 per 1000 for indirect credit. See American Bankers
Association Installment Lending Division Bulletins, Delinquency Rates on Bank Installment Loans
(1969-77). In the FTC Credit Practices Rulemaking, Ford Motor Credit Company stated that
about 4% of its customers have their vehicles repossessed each year. FTC Credit Practices Record,
supra note 8, R-I(a)-816 at 48. This translates into a monthly rate of about 3.3. repossessions per
1000 accounts. General Motors Acceptance Corporation estimates that it repossessed something
under 5 accounts per 1000 in an average month. Id. R-I(a)-812, at 5. Credit unions appear to
have repossession rates comparable to or lower than those for bank direct loans, although hard
statistics do not appear to be available. See testimony cited in FTC CREDIT PRACTICES STAFF
REPORT, supra note 1, at 262 n,31
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cant fraction of automobile repossessions, the U.C.C. section 9-504 sale is
made by a party — the dealer — who is patently well equipped to sell cars. It
would seem reasonable to assume that repossession sales by automobile
dealers, pursuant to recourse agreements with financers, will tend to yield
higher prices than will sales by financers themselves. The actual results of
repossession sales by both creditors and dealers will now be explored in detail.
IV. EARLIER STUDIES
The original empirical study of deficiencies following automobile reposses-
sions was published in 1969 by Philip Shuchman." Two later studies, by Fir-
min and Simpson in 1971 41
 and Corenswet in 1975, 42 followed Shuchman's
methodology. 43 In addition to records of repossessions and sales, the three
studies used published used car price guidebooks to estimate the retail and
wholesale value of the vehicles involved. A number of such guidebooks are
published by various organizations and are based on surveys of used car sales
by dealers or at auctions. Shuchman made use of the so-called Redbook; 44 Fir-
min and Simpson, the National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) Used
Car Guide,'" and Corenswet the Kelley Bluebook." All of these guidebooks are
used widely in the automobile sales industry.'" Information introduced in the
FTC Credit Practices Rulemaking suggests that price estimates for a given car
as of a given date in most guidebooks are likely to cluster within about 10% of
each other."
All three studies compared prices obtained in repossession sales with
guidebook prices to evaluate the efficiency of the sales on which deficiencies are
based. Both Shuchman and Firmin and Simpson also compared repossession
4° Shuchman, supra note 5.
4 1 Firmin & Simpson, supra note 5.
42 Corenswet, supra note 5.
" Repossessors ordinarily notify the police when cars are repossessed because surprised
repossessees often believe their cars to have been stolen and contact the police. Shuchman, supra
note 5, at 57. Shuchman therefore used police records to identify the most active repossessors in
the region studied (several areas in Connecticut). Shuchman then reviewed court records of defi-
ciency suits by the repossessing businesses to obtain information on the size of the deficiencies
sought. /d. at 58. Shuchman also traced the record of the relevant vehicles at the Connecticut
Department of Motor Vehicles. The Department files provided information on the price obtained
at the first retail sale of the cars following repossession. Id. Shuchman found that repossessed cars
were ordinarily sold wholesale to a car dealer who then sold them to retail customers. Id. at 29.
In their study of District of Columbia repossessions Firmin and Simpson used sources of
information similar to those used by Shuchman. Firmin & Simpson, supra note 5, at 532-34. The
third major early repossession study, by Ellen Corenswet, used court records on deficiency suits
in Alameda County, California. Corenswet, supra note 5, at 1084-85.
" Shuchman, supra note 5, at 27 n.28.
" Firmin & Simpson, supra note 5, at 516 n.26.
46 Corenswet, supra note 5, at 1085 n.17.
" See notes 44-46 supra.
" REPORT OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER ON PROPOSED TRADE REGULATION RULE:
CREDIT PRACTICES (FTC 1978) at 215.
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sale prices with another benchmark, the so-called "second resale" price.° This
price is that obtained when a car dealer who purchased a vehicle in a wholesale
repossession sale, or "first resale," resells it to a retail customer. 5° The second
resale price is an attractive benchmark because it is a price that was obtained
for the particular vehicle under consideration, and not merely a market
average like the guidebook price.
The results of the three major early studies of deficiencies are summarized
in Table 2. 3 ' These results indicate that repossessed cars are sold for prices
substantially lower than those obtained in other wholesale used car sales. Prices
obtained for repossessions in the three studies averaged from 71% to 84% of
book wholesale value. The Shuchman and Firmin and Simpson studies also
showed that following an initial wholesale sale, repossessions are resold for
prices approximating guidebook retail value. The closeness of the second sale
price to the guidebodk's retail value estimate suggests that there is nothing in-
trinsic to repossessed cars which prevents them from being sold at prices com-
parable to those obtained for other used cars.
While Table 2 indicates the major results of the studies, a number of addi-
tional details should be pointed out. Shuchman was unable to determine
whether the repossessions he studied were recourse transactions. However, in
about half of the cases studied, the plaintiff in the deficiency suit was the car
dealer, not the financer." This fact suggests that in these cases some sort of
recourse agreement resulting in a transfer of the creditor's rights was in effect,
although not necessarily an agreement which called for the dealer to make the
sale on which the deficiency was based. In any case, Shuchman observed no
clear differences in the results for the defaulting consumer depending on
whether the plaintiff was a dealer or financer."
Like Shuchman, Firmin and Simpson did not indicate whether the
repossessions they studied were subject to recourse. They did make the in-
teresting observation that in 71% of the cases studied, the sale which estab-
lished the deficiency was made by the repossessing financer to the dealer that
sold the repossessed car in the first place." They noted that this statistic raises
questions as to the arms length nature of the sales on which deficiency suits are
based. 55
49 Shuchman, supra note 5, at 32-33; Firman & Simpson, supra note 5, at 519-21.
5° Id.
3 ' This table is based in part on a table in Note, Defaulting Debtors and the judicial Process
— The FTC's Proposed Restriction on Deficiency Judgments: 1 444. 2(a)(7) of the Rule on Credit Practices, 8
CONN. L. REV. 457, 459 (1976).
" See Table 4 in Shuchman, supra note 5, at 40.
" Id. Contrast Shuchman's Table 4, line 9, with his Table 4, line 7. Shuchman, supra
note 5, at 40.
54
 Firmin & Simpson, supra note 5, at 517.
55 Id. In Shuchman's sample, 35% of repossession sales were made to the original
dealer. Table 4, lines 3 and 4 in Shuchman, supra note 5, at 40.
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The Corenswet study is particularly interesting because, in 37% of the
cases studied, the repossession sale was a retail sale to an individual, rather
than a wholesale sale to a dealer. 56
 Presumably, the retail sales reflect recourse
transactions in which the repossessed vehicle was returned to a dealer for
resale, although the study, like its predecessors, did explicitly distinguish
recourse from non-recourse transactions. 57 As might be expected, Corenswet
found that retail sales produced sharply higher prices than wholesale sales."
For new cars, retail sales produced prices averaging 95% of guidebook retail
value compared with 61% of retail value in wholesale sales. 59
 For cars that
were originally sold used, retail sales brought 75% of guidebook retail, com-
pared with 50% for wholesale sales. 6 °
In summary, the early studies of repossession sales under the U.C.C.
reached fairly consistent results. All of them observed a disparity between
average prices obtained in section 9-504 sales and the guidebook wholesale
value of repossessed automobiles. Shuchman and Firman and Simpson also
noted that repossessed cars sold for less than wholesale prices in section 9-504
sales are subsequently resold for prices approximating guidebook retail value.
Corenswet observed that some initial repossession sales are made to retail
customers and that these sales produce substantially higher prices than other
repossession sales. None of the studies, however, permit a clear comparison of
the effect of recourse and non-recourse disposition on the ultimate deficiencies
paid by consumers. Certain additional limitations of the early studies are
discussed below.
V. LIMITATIONS OF EARLIER STUDIES
The major limitation of the studies just described is that they are based on
court records, the only source of empirical data on deficiencies publicly
available at the time the studies were conducted. The data for the studies were
therefore confined to repossessions which led to a lawsuit to recover a deficien-
cy. Such repossessions account for only a minority of repossessions. 61
 Use of
data from court records thus raises the question of whether repossessions
leading to deficiency suits are characteristic of all repossessions. For example,
Corenswet, supra note 5, at 1086.
" Corenswet found that over 90% of deficiency suits in her sample were brought by
seven collection agencies. The suits were brought primarily on behalf of three automobile dealers
and four finance companies, implying a mix of recourse and non-recourse transactions. Id. at
1084.
58 Id, at 1086-87.
39 Id.
so Id. at 1087.
81
 Firmin and Simpson found that in 1968, 3700 automobile repossessions were record-
ed with the Washington, D.C. police.department. The repossessors listed with the police brought
600 deficiency suits during the same time period. Firmin & Simpson, supra note 5, at 533. It is
likely that the Firmin and Simpson figures do not cover all repossessions in Washington, D.C. in
the relevant time period since some repossessions take the form of voluntary transfers of the col-
lateral from the debtor to the creditor and would not require notification of the police.
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the methodology used in the three studies would not reveal whether some
repossessions lead to surpluses. Moreover, small deficiencies might be less like-
ly to result in collection suits than larger deficiencies and might therefore ap-
pear less often in court records. 62 Shuchman attempted to obtain information
on non-litigated deficiencies to check the generality of his results. Unfortunate-
ly, he was only able to obtain information concerning 11 repossessions from a
single financer. Shuchman, considered the results for these repossessions to be
consistent with those for litigated deficiencies, although the number was too
small for anything more than tentative conclusions. 63
A second limitation of the three studies is that they provide little informa-
tion on the condition of the cars in the samples used." Creditors frequently
argue that repossessed cars bring prices below book value because they are in
worse condition than other used cars. 65 Information on the condition of
repossessed cars would therefore be useful for a full evaluation of the results of
the three studies.
A third limitation of the studies is that they do not contain information on
the investment in sales commissions, repairs, and other costs of selling cars in a
retail rather than a wholesale manner. Shuchman and Firmin and Simpson
emphasized the contrast between the low prices obtained in repossession sales
and the higher prices obtained in retail "second resales." 66 However, retail
sale is likely to involve greater sales expense than wholesale sale. As noted
above, U.C.C. section 9-504 permits the creditor to allocate sale proceeds to
sale-related expenses. Therefore, information on the investment needed to ob-
tain retail prices is necessary to determine the precise effects the retailing of
repossessions would have on deficiencies. That retail second resales of reposses-
sions occur at all, however, implies that higher retail prices more than compen-
sate for the additional sales expense. Otherwise, profit-motivated car dealers
would not make such sales. Besides aiding second-resale analysis, information
on sales expense would be useful to evaluate the implications of Corenswet's
finding that retail first resales of repossessed cars produce higher prices than
wholesale sales.
62 In the FTC Credit Practices Rulemaking, the Texas Consumer Credit Commis-
sioner expressed the view that banks were likely to write off deficiencies under $500 but would file
suit to collect deficiencies over $1000 as much as half of the time. FTC Credit Practices Record, supra
note 8, at Tr. 1299.
It should be noted that there are reasons for not bringing a deficiency suit that are in-
dependent of the size of the deficiency. For example, the debtor might have paid without suit, the
debtor might be judgment proof, or the debtor might not be locatable.
63
 Shuchman, supra note 5, at 59. Other repossessors were unwilling to supply
Shuchman with information. Id.
64 Shuchman examined about 20 repossessed automobiles that were not part of his
primary study sample. He found that "all could be driven and were in normal condition." Id. at
31. Shuchman also noted that where there is serious damage to a repossessed vehicle, the secured
party is likely to be reimbursed by collision insurance, which automobile financers require. Id.
65 This was one of the points pressed most vigorously by creditors and car dealers dur-
ing the FTC Credit Practices proceeding. See, e.g. , the sources cited in the FTC CREDIT PRAC-
TICES STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 297-98 & n.128, 302-03.
66 See text at notes 49-50 supra.
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Despite the limitations just discussed, the results of the three studies are
sufficiently strong to raise serious questions concerning repossession sale prac-
tices. 67
 At a minimum they justify further inquiry. The results of such further
inquiry will now be presented.
VI. ANALYSIS OF FTC DATA
The information on repossession sales made available by the FTC Credit
Practices Rulemaking has a number of important advantages over that which
formed the basis of earlier studies. It is not confined to repossessions which
resulted in a deficiency suit. It clearly distinguishes non-recourse and recourse
repossessions, providing a basis for comparisons of different methods of han-
dling repossessions. It includes information on the condition of repossessions,
and on the effect of .retail sales on deficiencies taking into account sales and
repair costs. The FTC information will be discussed in several cntexts.
First, the data will be used to analyze repossession sales made by
creditors, includn will be discussed in several contexts.
First, the data will be used to analyze repossession sales made by
creditors, including non-recourse indirectly financed repossessions and
repossessions resulting from direct loans by financial institutions. This infor-
mation will be used to determine how repossession sale prices compare with
guidebook wholesaletvalue, and how the result information will be used to
determine how repossession sale prices compare with guidebook wholesale
value, and how the resulting deficiencies compare with the balance owed before
sale. Next, recourse transactions will be examined. It will be shown that
repossession sales conducted by dealers differ from those conducted by finan-
cial institutions in two ways. First, sales by dealers tend to be retail, not
wholesale. Second, the resulting deficiencies represent a smaller proportion of
the balance owed before sale. Dealer sales are thus more effective in liquidating
the outstanding debt.
After contrasting the methods and results of recourse and non-recourse
repossession sales, this section will review data on the condition of repossessed
automobiles and the effect of condition on deficiencies. Finally, the conclusions
reached by this analysis of the FTC data will be compared with those reached
by another recent study based on FTC rulemaking data.
A. Repossession Sales By Creditors
As part of their testimony or written submissions in the Credit Practices
proceeding, a number of major banks and finance companies submitted
67 The results are particularly strong if the studies are viewed as evaluations of regula-
tion of repossession and deficiencies by the courts. Apart from the statistics on litigated deficien-
cies described in this article, the studies contain extensive additional information on the role of
the courts in deficiency cases,. See Shuchman, supra note 5, at 34-38; Firmin & Simpson, supra
note 5, at 521-24.
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statistics on the repossession sales they make. This material was submitted
voluntarily and was not under oath. The statistics cover non-recourse, indirect-
ly financed repossessions and, in the case of banks, repossessions arising out of
loan transactions. The creditors generally supplied data on all of their reposses-
sion sales within a defined period. The data are therefore not confined to
repossessions which gave rise to a suit for a deficiency. The data reported
varied from creditor to creditor, but are summarized above in Table 3.
68
 This figure was calculated by subtracting the Ratio of Sale Price to Balance Owed
from 100%. It therefore does not take into account sales and repair expenses and underestimates
the true ratio of deficiencies to balance owed. Because creditors usually incur only limited ex-
penses in repossession sales, the approximate ratio reported in Table 3 will be reasonably close to
the true ratio. See note 95 infra. The approximate ratio was calculated to permit comparisons
with equivalent figures for recourse repossession sales.
68
 FTC Credit Practices Record, supra note 8, R-5(a)-812 at 9-10.
In addition to supplying information on repossession sales, several creditors also sup-
plied information on their success in collecting deficiencies once they are assessed. Estimated
ratios of money collected to the total amount of deficiencies reported in the FTC Credit Practices
Record include approximately 25% for Ford Motor Credit Corporation, id. at R-I(a)-816; ap-
proximately 15% for General Motors Acceptance Corporation, id. at R-I(a)-812; 18% for
Security Pacific National Bank, id., FIX-204 at 5; about 6% for the Bank of America, id. at Tr.
5668; and approximately 15% for large banks responding to the American Bankers Association
Survey, id. at Tr. 12208. The 15% figure for large banks was calculated from the average charge-
off and deficiency figures in the survey. Some question attaches to this result due to ambiguity in
the survey questionnaire. Sce id. at Tr. 12253.
7° Id. R-I(a)-816, at 30-31.
" Id. HX-205, Appendix at 1.
" In addition to comparing sale prices for its repossessions with guidebook wholesale
value, Security Pacific compared them with what it called the "actual cash value" of the vehicles
based on individual appraisals. According to Security Pacific, sales prices averaged 97.8% of ac-
tual cash value. Id.
73 Id., HX-227 at 6.
74 Id., HX-500 at Table 5.
" The survey instrument was sent to a random sample of banks stratified by size.
Respondents were asked to supply figures on, inter alia, total balance owed on and amount received
from sale of repossessions during 1976. Results were reported only for banks with deposits of
1100 million or more due to low response rates for smaller banks. A detailed description of survey
methodology and results is attached to HX-500 of the FTC Credit Practices Record.
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Overall, the figures reported by different creditors in Table 3 are highly
consistent, particularly with respect to the comparison of sales price with
guidebook wholesale value. Moreover, the results are consistent with the
results of the earlier studies of repossession sales, based on court records. For
example, repossession sale prices reported by creditors in the FTC proceeding
clustered around 80% of guidebook wholesale value. In the earlier studies,
average prices ranged from 71% to 84% of guidebook wholesale. The FTC
data thus indicate that the results of earlier studies are reasonably accurate for
repossession sales by creditors. Results in such sales will now be compared with
those in sales by dealers pursuant to recourse agreements.
B. Repossession Sales by Dealers
Creditors and car dealers who participated in the Credit Practices
Rulemaking supplied little quantitative information on repossession sales in
recourse transactions. To fill this gap, the author and his colleagues analyzed a
body of data on recourse repossessions obtained by the FTC in connection with
litigation the agency was pursuing. 76 The information takes the form of reports
submitted by car dealers on all repossession sales they made during a
designated period in the second half of 1974 and first half of 1975." A descrip-
tion of the sample of dealers, taken from the FTC Credit Practices Staff Report, is
appended to this article.
The recourse data were first used to establish whether recourse reposses-
sions are in fact handled differently than other repossessions. The data show
that a large majority of recourse repossessions are sold retail, not wholesale like
most other repossessions. Reports from two different subsamples of car dealers
support this conclusion. One subsample consists of all dealers who explicitly
reported whether sales were retail or wholesale. 78 Of the thirteen dealers in this
subsample, eleven retailed at least two-thirds of their repossessions.
The second subsample studied consisted of all dealers who submitted in-
formation on sales expenses for all of the repossessions they reported. This sub-
sample included seventeen dealers. 79 These dealers reported on a total of 885
repossession sales. Most of these dealers did not indicate explicitly whether
sales were retail or wholesale. 8° They did indicate, however, whether a sales
76 See note 8 supra.
" Data from 59 dealers were placed on the FTC Credit Practices Record. The precise in-
formation supplied varied from dealer to dealer so data from different subsamples of the 59
dealers were used for different analyses.
70 This subsample included 13 dealers located in 10 states. Identities of the dealers and
the location of their submissions on the FTC Credit Practices Record can be found in the FTC
CREDIT PRACTICES STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, Appendix C at 4.
"Identities of the 17 dealers and the location of their submissions on the FTC Credit Prac-
tices Record can be found in the FTC CREDIT PRACTICES STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, Appendix
C at 5-6.
8° There were two exceptions. These two dealers were therefore members of both dealer
subsamples studied by the author.
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commission was paid on each sale. Such a commission would ordinarily be
paid on a retail sale. Sales commissions were reported in approximately 75% of
sales (666 of 885), implying that about 75% of sales were retail.
The recourse data thus indicate that recourse repossessions are in fact
handled differently than other repossessions. Most of them are sold retail
rather than wholesale. This is true despite the absence of a legal requirement
that recourse repossessions be retailed.
More importantly, perhaps, the recourse data convey information about
the effect of retail sales on deficiencies. Data from the second dealer subsample
mentioned above were analyzed for this purpose.'[ The analysis was based on
the deficiencies or surpluses reported by the dealers for each of their reposses-
sions, taking into account whatever expenses the dealers saw fit. The accuracy
of the analysis is thus influenced by the accuracy with which dealers reported
expenses and calculated surpluses and deficiencies. Most dealers in the sub-
sample took into account sales commissions and costs of repair and recondi-
tioning; a few took into account other expenses as wel1. 82
8 ' See text at note 79 supra.
as The subpoenas sent to the dealers asked for information on repair expenses, sales
commissions, and any other expenses the dealer incurred as a result of retaking or selling the
repossessed vehicle. Examples of the subpoenas sent to dealers can be found in the FTC Credit
Practices Record, supra note 8, at R-XI-'67.
The sales and repair expenses reported by most dealers in the sample are the major ex-
penses directly attributable to the sale of repossessions. See Davisson & Taggart, Financial and
Operating Characteristics of Automobile Dealers and the Franchise System, TWO STUDIES IN AUTOMOBILE
FRANCHISING 161 (1 Mich. Bus. Studies 1974). Courts have historically held that only direct ex-
penses can be counted in calculating deficiencies and surpluses. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY IN-
TERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY $5 44.8, 43.5 (1965). There is some recent controversy,
however, about whether a share of dealers' overhead or fixed expenses should be counted in
determining deficiencies and surpluses, or in making economic comparisons of different methods
of selling repossessed vehicles. E.g., Ford Motor Co., et at., 94 F.T.C. 564, 612-13, 630-34
(1979); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 1118 (2d ed. 1980). The overhead issue involve's subtle economic questions. See 1 A.
KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 77-83, 87-103 (1970) (general discussion of allocation
of overhead type costs); 94 F.T.C. at 630 (FTC finds strong arguments on both sides of issue). A
definitive resolution of the issue requires analysis and research beyond the scope of this article,
and may require a more adequate economic theory of security interests than now exists. See
generally, Schwartz, infra note 115, concerning inadequacies of current theories. Pending a
definitive treatment, however, a strong argument can be made that overhead costs should not be
counted. Overhead reflects the costs to a dealer of keeping its facilities open for business, in-
dependent of costs attributable to any given sale. See Davisson & Taggart, supra, at 145 (examples
of fixed or overhead expenses). Virtually all car dealers maintain used car sales facilities which
can be employed for the retail sale of repossessions. Such facilities would exist regardless of
whether repossessions are retailed. Retailing repossessions thus creates little or no new overhead
and the true cost of retailing repossessions is- confined to direct costs such as sales commissions.
Therefore, only such costs should be counted.
White the argument just presented seems persuasive, further research and analysis
would be desirable on a number of points. For example, it would be useful to study more closely
the relation, if any, between the method of sale of repossessions and the capacity of dealer
facilities. See generally Davisson & Taiggart, supra, at 148 (discussion of size of facilities necessary to
support a given volume of sales). It should also be noted that the argument presented applies only
to car dealers and not to repossession sales by creditors.
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To measure the performance of sales by recourse dealers, the ratio of net
deficiencies to amounts owed by debtors at time of repossession was calculated.
The ratio was calculated by dividing A/B where:
A = the sum total of all deficiencies less the sum total of all surpluses
for all repossessed cars in the sample studied.
B = the sum total of the net amounts owed by the debtors at time of
repossession for all repossessed cars in the sample studied.
The dealers in the recourse sample did not directly report the amount owed by
the debtors. However, the dealers did report their payoff to the repossessing
creditor for each repossession. Under the usual terms of recourse agreements,
this payoff amount equals or closely approximates the amount owed by the
debtor. 83 It was therefore used as a substitute measure of the amount owed.
The ratio of net deficiencies to net balance owed was calculated separately
for retail sales, wholesale sales, and all sales by the seventeen dealers in the
subsample. The results are reported in Table 4:
Table 4
Net Deficiencies
as Percent of Net
Number	 Percent	 Balance Owed at
of Cars	 of Sample	 Time of Repossession
Retail Sales 666 75 15
Wholesale Sales 219 25 44
All Sales 885 100 18
The figures in Table 4 indicate that recourse sales produce deficiencies
that are significantly smaller, as a percentage of the balance owed, than those
in sales by creditors. For all recourse transactions in the sample the ratio of net
deficiencies to net balance owed comes to 18%. This result should be compared
with equivalent ratios ranging from 25% to over 40% for sales by creditors. 84 If
one focuses on retail sales in recourse transactions, the deficiency ratio
averages 15%. The comparison with wholesale sales by creditors is therefore
even more striking. 85
Several other interesting points can be drawn from the data provided by
" See text at notes 30-31 supra.
84 See Table 3 in text at note 68 supra.
85 The 15% figure, however, may not be strictly comparable to the figures reported by
creditors. The creditor figures are based on all their repossession sales during the relevant sample
periods while the 15% figure is based only on the recourse repossessions which were retailed.
Although the retailed repossessions constitute 75% of all sales by the recourse dealers in the sub-
sample, it is possible that the wholesaled cars were in especially poor condition or otherwise below
average in intrinsic value.
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the seventeen dealers who reported on deficiencies and sales expenses.
Surpluses rather than deficiencies were reported in 119 of the 885 sales by these
dealers. Surpluses thus appeared in 13% of all sales in the recourse transac-
tions, and in 15% of all retail sales by the recourse dealers. 86 By contrast,
surpluses rarely appear in non-recourse repossession sales." The 119 surpluses
averaged $254.
Repair costs reported by the dealers averaged $200 per vehicle for all 885
repossessions in the sample." This level of average expenditure was sufficient,
as of 1974-75, to put 75% of all of their repossessions in good enough condition
to be sold to retail customers. Such data, together with information on condi-
tion of repossessions discussed below, suggest that reasonable investments in
repairs might significantly improve the prices obtained for non-recourse
repossessions.
C. Condition of Repossessed Cars
and its Effect on Prices Obtained in Sales by Creditors
Repossessing creditors often appraise the cars they repossess, or, at least,
make a summary evaluation of their condition." Such evaluations by creditors
were the basis for two analyses of the condition of repossessions made by the
author and his colleagues in connection with the Credit Practices Rulemaking.
One of these analyses was based on information contained in some 2,000
repossession reports filed with the Consumer Credit Commission of the State of
Maryland, primarily by Ford Motor Credit Company. 9° The sample includes
all reports filed from October 1975 through December 1977. The results can be
found in Table 5:
Table 5
Condition of Vehicle
(Percent of total observitions)
Number
Area of Good/ Fair/ Poor/ Junk/ of Obser-
Vehicle clean average rough wreck Total vations
Exterior 28 46 22 4 100 1973
Interior 24 52 20 4 100 1974
Mechanical 29 45 21 4 100 1826
86 Virtually all of the surpluses appeared in retail sales.
" See text and note at note 19 supra.
88 For the 666 repossessions in the subsample which were retailed, sales commissions
averaged $114.
89 See, e.g., repossession report forms in Chrysler Credit Corporation Operations
Manual, FTC Credit Practices Record, supra note 8, at R-X1-168, Number 651, Exhibit D; Ford
Motor Credit Corporation procedure manuals, id. R-XI-169, Number 643 at 1-2.
9° This analysis was conducted under the supervision of Eugene Trisko. The data and a
description of the analysis can be found in FTC Credit Practices Record, supra note 8, at R-XIII-6.
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A second source of data on the condition of repossessed cars is a set of
reports on individual repossessions supplied to the FTC in 1971 by General
Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) in response to compulsory
process. 9 ' The reports covered a random sample of repossessions sold by cer-
tain specified GMAC offices, primarily in the New York City and Cleveland
metropolitan areas. 92 Information on condition (as rated by GMAC) and defi-
ciencies was analyzed for 381 repossessions sold by seven offices during the
period from January 1, 1970 through May 31, 1971. 93 Results of the analysis
are set forth in Table 6:
Table 6
Resale Price
GMAC as % of NADA Deficiency
Condition Number Percent Guidebook as % of
Rating of Cars of Sample Wholesale Balance Owed
Good 83 22 95.4 28.6
Fair 141 37 80.8 37
Poor 130 34 56 43
Wreck 27 7 29.2 32
Entire Sample 381 100 74.8 36
The results in Table 6 suggest that the condition of repossessed cars does
have an important effect on sales prices received. This is hardly surprising.
Whether or not repossessed cars are sold for prices that are excessively low
from a legal or policy perspective, a repossession in good condition would still
be expected to sell for a higher price than one in bad condition. For this reason,
it is also not surprising that deficiencies reported in Table 6 are larger for
repossessions in worse condition, with the exception of wrecks. In the latter
case, insurance settlements reduce deficiencies."
Sales expenses listed for the 381 repossessions in the sample averaged $55,
9 ' The GMAC submission is described in detail in a document in FTC Credit Practices
Record, supra note 8, at R-XI-70. The repossession reports themselves are in the record at
R-XI-70-71.
92 FTC Credit Practices Record, supra note 8, at R-XI-70.
93 The offices were Bayside and Brooklyn, New York; East Orange and Patterson, New
Jersey; and Cleveland, Lakewood, and Shaker Heights, Ohio.
" According to the figures in Table 6, deficiencies as a percentage of balance owed are
smaller for wrecked cars than for cars in poor, or even fair, condition. This is true despite the
much lower sales price obtained for the repossessions classified as wrecks. The reason for this
seemingly paradoxical result is that GMAC, like other creditors, requires collision insurance on
financed cars. In repossession situations, payments from such insurance serve to reduce the
balance owed by the debtor. Of the 27 "totalled" cars in Table 6, the insurance company paid
out on 21. These insurance settlements averaged $960. There were smaller insurance payments
on slightly over half of the cars listed as "poor", a third of the "fair" cars, and 12% of the
"good" condition cars. These numbers suggest that collision insurance plays an important role
in reducing creditor and debtor losses in repossession situations, although it does not eliminate
such losses.
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apparently including repair and refurbishing, if any. This result suggests that
little effort was made to repair vehicles before sale. Other information on the
FTC Credit Practices Record also indicates that creditors usually make only a
very limited investment in reconditioning before selling repossessed cars. 95
Since the condition of a repossessed vehicle has an important effect on
sales price," it seems likely that an increased investment in reconditioning
would substantially increase the prices obtained for repossessions by creditors.
There remains the question, however, of whether the increase would be suffi-
cient to compensate for the added expense. The experience of recourse dealers,
described above, suggests that reconditioning beyond the minimal amount now
undertaken by creditors might well pay for itself. 97
D. Comparison with Results of Another
Study Based on the FTC Data
Professor Shuchman has recently published an article on deficiencies based
on FTC rulemaking data similar to that used in this article." In his study
Shuchman used a slightly different selection from the available data, and a
somewhat different analytical approach, particularly with respect to recourse
repossessions. His results are nevertheless highly consistent with those reported
in this article.
Like this article, Shuchman used data from GMAC to study the effect of
the condition of repossessions on sales price. 99 The figures reported are
generally within a few percentage points of these reported in Table 6 above.'"
For example, Table 6 reports that GMAC achieved a resale price equal to
95 Of a sample of 38 cars sold by Security Pacific Bank on September 8, 1977, recondi-
tioning expenses were incurred on only six, and in two cases the amounts were under $40. Other
expenses (excluding transportation expenses which were incurred for several cars) averaged $76,
most of which went for storage expenses. Calculated from data supplied by Security Pacific Bank
in FTC Credit Practices Record, supra note 8, at HX-204 app.
A review of eight Branch Quality Control Summary Reports from 1970-71 for various
Ford Motor Credit Company offices revealed yearly average reconditioning expenses for all
repossessions disposed of ranging from one to sixteen dollars. Other expenses averaged from $22
to $54. FTC Credit Practices Record, supra note 8, at R-XI-78.
96 See Table 6 in text at note 93 supra.
97 Recourse dealers were able to put their repossessions in good enough condition so
that 75% could be retailed with expenditures of only $200 per car. See text at note 88 supra.
However, dealers probably can recondition cars at lower cost than most creditors, who would
have to contract for services.
Shuchman, Condition and Value of Repossessed Automobiles, 21 WM. AND MARY L. REV.
'15 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Shuchman, 19791. Shuchman's research was performed pursuant
to an FTC contract.
99 See note 91.supra for a reference to this data. Shuchman's sample includes a total of
236 GMAC repossession reports as compared with 381 analyzed by the author. Shuchman,
1979, supra note 98, at 31. Shuchman also apparently excluded cars which were total wrecks from
his analysis, presumably because they raise different issues (for example, the effect of collision in-
surance) than do repossessions which are salable as drivable vehicles.
L°° Table 6 in text at note 93 supra; Shuchman, 1979, supra note 98, at 33.
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95.4% of NADA guidebook wholesale value for cars in good condition, and
80.8% of guidebook value for cars in fair condition. Shuchman's equivalent
mean figures were 92% and 78%, respectively. Shuchman reported a smaller
percentage of repossessions in poor condition than is reported in Table 6. 101
Shuchman also observed a somewhat higher resale price for collateral in poor
condition than is reported in Table 6. 102 The differences are not dramatic,
however, and can probably be explained by the different data samples used in
the two analyses. Overall, Shuchman's results based on the GMAC data are
consistent with those reported in this article.' 03
Shuchman studied two sets of data taken from the recourse dealer
repossession reports described above.'" Unlike this article, Shuchman's study
did not analyze the deficiencies and surpluses that result from recourse
repossessions, or the effect of sales and repair expenses. Instead Shuchman ex-
amined resale prices, providing an additional basis for comparing recourse and
non-recourse repossessions.'"
Despite the difference in approach and the use of different data sub-
samples, Shuchman's results for recourse repossessions are again largely con-
sistent with those reported here. Shuchman found that 77% of the recourse
repossessions he studied were sold in a retail manner compared with a figure of
75% reported above. 166 Shuchman also reported that resale prices for reposses-
sions which were retailed averaged slightly over 100% of the principal balance
owed. 107 This would seem to imply an average deficiency level of zero. By con-
trast, in the retailed recourse repossessions analyzed for this article, net defi-
ciencies averaged 15% of the balance owed by debtors.'" The two figures can
be reconciled, however, if one takes into account that sales and repair expenses
add to the size of deficiencies and are not included in Shuchman's statistic. It is
not surprising that such expenses would be significant in retail sales.
Shuchman's results for wholesale sales of recourse repossessions are more
surprising when compared with the results of this study. Resale prices obtained
for these repossessions averaged 85% of the balance owed in one of
101 In Table 6, 34% of GMAC repossessions are reported to be in poor condition.
Twenty-seven percent of Shuchman's sample is classified as poor. Shuchman, 1979, supra note
98, at 31.
'" Shuchman reports that resale prices averaged 67% of NADA guidebook wholesale
value for cars in poor condition. Id. at 33. The equivalent Table 6 figure is 56%.
' 03 One additional difference between the two studies is that Table 6 reports figures for
deficiencies as a percentage of balance owed while Shuchman reports on resale price as a percen-
tage of balance owed. Id. at 34. However, Shuchman's sale price percentage figures are
mathematically consistent with the deficiency percentage figures reported in Table 6.
104 See text at notes 76-77 supra for a description of these data. The division of the
recourse data studied by Shuchman into two sets was apparently done for practical reasons in the
course of the analysis and does not reflect differences in the nature of the data.
'" 6 Shuchman, 1979, supra note 98, at 37-38.
106 Id. at 37, 38. The 77% figure is an average for all cases in both of Shuchman's
recourse data sets. See id.
10 ' Id. at 38.
' 06 Table 4 in text at note 83 supra.
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Shuchman's recourse data sets and 80% of the balance owed in the other.'°° By
contrast, in the sample of recourse repossessions analyzed for this article, defi-
ciencies averaged 44% of the balance owed. For a given set of repossessions,
average deficiencies (expressed as a percent of balance owed) plus average sales
price (expressed as a percent of balance owed) equals 100% plus expenses (ex-
pressed as a percent of balance owed)."° Shuchman's estimates of price as a
percent of balance owed for wholesaled recourse repossessions are therefore
consistent with the deficiency figures reported in this article only if recourse
dealers incur substantial expenses in disposing of such repossessions."' The
conclusion that recourse dealers incur substantial expenses in wholesale
repossession sales is a troubling one, however. Recourse dealers might be ex-
pected to wholesale precisely those repossessions in which they do not wish to
make a major investment. Any inference that recourse dealers incur substan-
tial expenses when they wholesale repossessions should therefore be treated as
tentative. The apparent conclusion may merely be an artifact created by the
comparison of two studies using different data and analytical approaches.
Shuchman also compared the resale prices obtained in recourse reposses-
sions with NADA guidebook values. For retailed repossessions, prices averaged
90% of guidebook retail value in one of his recourse data sets and 91 % of
guidebook retail value in the other. 12
 These figures are consistent with the prop-
osition that recourse dealers retail most of their repossessions in a manner com-
parable to the way in which they sell other used cars, and with results that are
almost as satisfactory.
For recourse repossessions that were wholesaled, prices averaged 80% of
NADA guidebook wholesale value in one data set and 74% of guidebook
wholesale in the other. 13
 These figures are comparable to those reported for
wholesale repossession sales by creditors in Table 3 above." 4
Overall, Shuchman's results using the new FTC data are highly consis-
tent with those reported here both for wholesale. -sales by creditors and retail
sales by dealers. Some policy implications of those results will now be con-
sidered.
1 ° 9
 Shuchman, 1979, supra note 98, at 38 (85% figure for Shuchman's Data Set B and
80% figure for his Data Set.D).
119
 This formula follows from the rules for the determination of deficiencies set forth in
U C .C. 9-504(1).
m This is true because 44% (this study's deficiency estimate) + 80% (Shuchman's
Data Set D figure for sales prices) - 124%, and 44% (this study's deficiency estimate) + 85%
(Shuchman's figure for Data Set B sales prices) 129%. In accordance with the formula in the
text, these figures imply that recourse dealers incur expenses equal to 24% or 29% of the balance
owed.
" 2 Shuchman, 1979, supra note 98, at 38 (90% figure for Data Set B, 91% figure for
Data Set D).
13 Id. (80% figure for Data Set B and 74% figure for Data Set D).
" 4 An additional set.of data studied by Shuchman consists of 63 files containing infor-
mation on repossession sales by several GMAC offices. Shuchman, 1979, supra note 98, at 39.
Results for these sales are consistent with those reported by creditors in Table 3, above. Compare
Shuchman, 1979, supra note 98, at 40 with Table 3 in text at note 68 supra.
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VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The results of the early repossession studies convinced the authors of the
studies that the Uniform Commercial Code was unsatisfactory as a statute for
the regulation of repossession in consumer transactions. The studies indicated
that deficiencies were determined based on sales of repossessed vehicles for less
than wholesale market value and concluded that the U.C.C. deficiency
mechanism allowed consumers to be victimized by the poor sales practices of
repossessing creditors.
In one sense, the data reviewed in this article show the U.C.C. approach
in a better light. A sizable fraction of repossessions are sold in the retail market
for roughly the same prices as other used cars. The result is deficiencies that are
modest compared with those revealed by the earlier studies. In a not insignifi-
cant number of cases surpluses — previously thought a chimera or a symbol of
the unrealism of the U.C.C. — appear.
These happy results, however, are only characteristic of the recourse sec-
tor of the repossession market. For other repossessions, the newer data, on the
whole, confirm the results of the early studies. Moreover, the successful retail
sale of many repossessions makes the results achieved in non-recourse reposses-
sion sales appear all the more questionable. The new data raise implications for
a number of proposals for reform of the U.C.C.'s deficiency standard.' ' 5
Reform proposals can be divided into two broad categories — those that
would ban deficiencies altogether, and those that would allow deficiencies, but
with greater restrictions that are imposed by the U.C.C. A ban on deficiencies
is often called an "election of remedies" requirement because the creditor
must choose whether to repossess or to sue for the amount of the debt without
retaking the collateral. 16 One state, New Mexico, has adopted an election of
remedies requirement in all secured consumer credit transactions."'
Washington has a similar requirement, but only in sales finance transactions
and not for secured consumer loans. 18 About 20 additional states have adopted
election of remedies requirements but have drafted them to exclude most or all
115 In drawing policy implications from the empirical data, this article will not attempt a
full-scale analysis of the welfare economics of deficiencies. For an introduction to the complexities
of the economics of security interests see Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A
Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEG. STUDIES 1 (1981). In consumer transactions, security in-
terests probably have some economic functions not dealt with by Schwartz. In particular, it
seems likely that in automobile credit the most important function of security interests is reducing
the transaction costs involved in collection.
116 Firmin and Simpson, and Shuchman in his 1969 article, favor a more restrictive pro-
posal. The sole remedy they would allow the secured creditor in consumer transactions is strict
foreclosure or, in other words, repossession with no further obligation on the part of the debtor.
The creditor could not elect to ignore the collateral and sue the debtor. Firmin & Simpson, supra
note 5, at 530-31. Shuchman, supra note 5, at 54-55.
17 N.M. STAT. ANN. S 55-9-504(2) (1978).
He WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 62A.9-501(1) (1966).
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automobile transactions. 19 Typically these statutes apply only to transactions
below a specified dollar amount. ' 2°
Since the Firmin and Simpson study and the original Shuchman study im-
ply that deficiencies are the result of an extremely inefficient sales process, they
tend to support an across the board ban on deficiencies in automobile reposses-
sions. The results of the Corenswet study and this article, however, indicate
that many deficiencies are assessed based on retail sales by car dealers. The
vehicles involved are merchandised as effectively as other used cars. This find-
ing suggests that at least some deficiencies should be permitted on the assump-
tion that an efficient sales process legitimates the deficiency claim.
Advocates of a complete ban on deficiencies point out that any standard
allowing deficiencies in selective cases requires detailed policing of deficiencies
by the courts to ensure that the standard is met. 121 In practice, it is argued, this
policing is unlikely to occur. Most consumers sued for deficiencies are ill-
equipped to defend themselves in court and most deficiency suits result in
default judgments.' 22 The argument is persuasive, to the extent that it
demonstrates that a standard allowing deficiencies in certain cases raises
serious problems of enforceability by consumers. Thus, the choice of an elec-
tion of remedies by a state legislature may be rational even if a more flexible
standard is preferable in theory.
Enforceability, however, is only one consideration to be weighed in
establishing a legal standard; and reform proposals which allow deficiencies are
worth considering despite the enforcement problem. An example of such a pro-
posal is the deficiency provision of the FTC's proposed Credit Practices Trade
Regulation Rule.' 23 This provision would make it an unfair trade practice for a
creditor to use a consumer credit contract which: "Fails to provide that if the
creditor retakes encumbered property from the consumer, the fair market retail
value of the property so taken will be credited toward the balance due under the
obligation. " 124 Under this provision, a deficiency would be determined by sub-
tracting the fair market retail value of the collateral from the balance due. The
provision is silent as to how fair market retail value is to be determined.
Presumably, either the price received at an actual retail sale or an appraised
retail value could be used.
The FTC proposal would leave in effect all provisions of the U.C.C. ex-
cept for the one which allows deficiencies to be determined based on the sale
price in a non-retail "commercially reasonable" sale.'" Where a non-retail
19 See FTC CREDIT PRACTICES STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 254-57.
120 Id.
121 Shuchman, supra note 5, at 36-38. Firmin & Simpson, supra note 5, at 528-30. See
references to consumer groups who participated in FTC Credit Practices Rulemaking cited in
FTC CREDIT PRACTICES STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 307 n.156.
122 Id. This criticism of legal standards which attempt to regulate but not ban deficien-
cies applies to U.C.C. § 9-504 as well as to proposals to reform the U.C.C. Id.
]4' Proposed 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(7), 40 Fed. Reg. 16347 (1975).
"4 Id.
145 U.C.C. 9-504(3).
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price was obtained, the FTC rule would substitute an appraised retail value for
the actual sales price in determining the deficiency. Otherwise the deficiency
would be determined in accord with U:C.C. section 9-504. Thus, costs of
disposition could still be factored in by the creditor in determining the deficien-
cy or surplus.
Two states have adopted a form of retail value standard for determining
deficiencies in automobile repossessions.' 26 To provide a simple method for
determining retail value, these states have legislatively authorized the use of
price guidebooks. By providing a simple method for determining compliance
with the legislated deficiency standard, these states have attempted to deal with
the enforcement problem raised by proponents of a complete ban on deficien-
cies. For example, a Florida statute provides that deficiencies will be deter-
mined based on fair market value and that this figure is presumed to be the
guidebook retail value. 127 The Florida statute, however, applies only to li-
censed small loan companies.' 28 Such companies play a very limited role in the
automobile credit market.'"
A Connecticut statute, not so narrow in its application, covers all credit
used to finance automobiles costing over $2000, and determines deficiencies by
subtracting fair market value from the balance owed. 13° Fair market value is
presumed to be the average of the retail value and the trade-in value as stated
in the Eastern Edition of the National Automobile Dealers Association Used Car
Guide. "1 The statutory presumption can be rebutted "only by direct in-court
testimony."'" By averaging retail and trade-in value Connecticut's deficiency
standard takes into account, in a rough way, sales expenses and the often less
than perfect condition of repossessed cars, without requiring a specific inquiry
into both factors in every case. The statute thus can be viewed as a variation on
the basic idea of a retail value standard.
The data reviewed in this article tend to support a retail value standard, if
only by showing that retail sale of repossessions occurs frequently and is
therefore, plainly, possible. Moreover, the finding that retail sales produce
smaller deficiencies than other methods of disposition indicates that retail dis-
position benefits consumers whose cars have been repossessed. At the same
time, the finding that profit motivated car dealers choose retail disposition for
most repossessions which are turned over to them indicates that such disposi-
tion is consistent with creditor interests as well.'"
126
 These states arc Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. 516.31(3) (West Supp. 1981) and Con-
necticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 42-98(g) (West Supp. 1981).
127 FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 516.31(3) (West Supp. 1981),
128 See id. at 5 516.
1 " 1981 Finance Facts, supra note 23, at 56.
' 3° CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 42-98(g) (West Supp. 1981).
131 Id.
132 Id .
'" The term "creditor interests" in the text includes an element of consumer interest
since costs incurred by creditors and car dealers are likely to be passed on to their customers in
the form of higher prices and interest rates or more restrictive credit terms.
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The satisfactory results of retail disposition, however, are documented on-
ly for repossessions that are now handled on a recourse basis. This fact raises
the question of whether institutional considerations make it impossible or
uneconomic for other repossessions to be retailed.
For non-recourse indirect credit, such considerations may not be very
strong. Choice of non-recourse financing appears to be largely a result of
regional custom, not economic necessity. For example, in 1977 non-recourse
business accounted for under 15% of indirect automobile credit held by banks
in the New England and Pacific Census regions, over 83.3% in the East North
Central region, and from 43.5% to 60.5% in other regions of the country. 134 In
the FTC Credit Practices Rulemaking, a banker testified at a hearing in
Dallas: "Strangely enough Fort Worth, 30 miles to the west of here, is a non-
recourse city, and if a lender attempted to set up with recourse finance plan, he
would get no business at all. Here in Dallas, it's just the opposite. Why this is,
I don't know, . . ."'" Another witness in the proceeding testified that in
Missouri the urban market was non-recourse while the rural market was on a
recourse basis. 136
 Overall, it is difficult to see what economic factors would ac-
count for the observed patterns of use of recourse and non-recourse financing.
If failure to use recourse is largely a matter of custom, there may be no com-
pelling economic objection to the increased use of recourse agreements in in-
direct automobile financing. Indirect credit accounts for a large majority of all
repossessions,'" so it is likely that most repossessions could be retailed with on-
ly a modest change in existing institutional arrangements — i.e., wider use of
recourse.
Even with increased use of recourse, retail disposition still may not be a
satisfactory alternative for all repossessions. About a quarter of recourse
repossessions are not currently retailed,' 38
 probably for sound economic
reasons.'" In addition, there is no existing mechanism, such as recourse, by
which loan transaction repossessions are customarily retailed. While the possi-
bility of retail disposition in loan transactions should not be dismissed out of
hand,'" there may be repossessions for which retailing is either not possible, or
not economically efficient.
If retail disposition is usually, but not always, feasible, there is an attrac-
tiveness to a standard which requires deficiencies based on retail value in most
instances, but offers some flexibility. One approach to such a standard is of-
194
 American Bankers Association 1977 INSTALLMENT/CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT,
supra note 29, at 32.
'" FTC Credit Practices Record, supra. note 8, at Tr. 1167-68.
"6 Id. at Tr. 3019.
" 7
 See text at notes 38-39 supra.
' 3R See text at notes 80-81 supra.
139
 For example, a handbook for car dealers advises that for used cars of all kinds it is a
good business practice to turn over inventory within 30 days, if necessary by wholesaling cars
that cannot be sold retail within this time period. BURY, supra note 28, at 67.
140
 One possibility is that lenders could enter into contractual arrangements with dealers
to market repossessions. A number of lenders, for example, have used consignment ar-
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fered by the FTC decision in Ford Motor Co., et al. 141 The Commission's order
required the respondent automobile dealer to "dispose of any repossessed vehi-
cle in a manner designed to obtain the best possible price.'" 42 The order defined
"best possible price" as meaning: "that respondent will exercise every
reasonable effort to market the vehicle for the highest possible net return for the
debtor's account (in terms of proceeds less allowable expenses) ... . ,, 143 In
other words, the dealer was required to sell the collateral in a manner
calculated to minimize the debtor's deficiency, or maximize the debtor's
surplus, as determined under the U.C.C. section 9-504. The Commission took
the view that in declaring a best possible price standard it was merely applying
existing state law concerning the duties of a repossessing creditor.'"
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the FTC order.' 45 The court ruled
that the best possible price standard was a novel interpretation of U.C.C.
§ 9-504, not a mere restatement of existing law.'" The court concluded that
because the Commission was enunciating a new legal standard of general ap-
plication it should have proceeded by means of rulemaking rather than ad-
judication.' 47 Whether the Commission or the court is correct about the novel-
ty of best possible price, it seems clear that such a standard is consistent with
the U.C.C. commercial reasonableness requirement. 148 It is a standard which
rangements. See FTC CREDIT PRACTICES STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 282.
Direct sales by lenders to consumers may also be feasible in some cases. A number of
creditors already sell repossessions to consumers. Id. at 282 n.87. In addition, many large lenders
now wholesale one hundred or more repossessions each year. This is a volume of business as
large as that of a typical used car lot, suggesting that it might be feasible for these dealers to set up
a retail sales facility. Id. at 282-84.
141 94 F.T.C. 564 (1979). In this case the FTC initially sued Ford Motor Company,
Ford Motor Credit Company, and a representative dealer, Francis Ford. The first two named
plaintiffs settled with the FTC, leaving the final litigation against the dealer. Id. at 564-65. The
primary thrust of the Commission's decision was the enforcement of the U.C.C. imposed duty to
return surpluses to consumers when they appear following repossession sales. Id. at 607. The
decision also addressed a number of other issues, including the question of what expenses are
allowable under the U.C.C. in determining surpluses or deficiencies. Id. at 612-16.
"2 Id. at 640.
'" Id. at 639.
'" Id. at 609. See Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge, id. at 590-92, for a
discussion of relevant state cases.
' 45 Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 654 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1981), The Commission has peti-
tioned the 9th Circuit for a rehearing en bane.
16 To be precise, the court stated "we have been cited to no case which has interpreted
[U.C.C. § 9-504] to require a secured creditor to credit the debtor for the 'best possible price'
and not charge him for overhead and lost profits." Id. at 601. Taken literally, the court's
language states that the novelty was in the combination of the best possible price standard with
the Commission's standard for allowable expenses (which excludes overhead and lost profits).
1 " Id. at 601-02.
140 An argument to the contrary, however, can be made based on U.C.C. § 9-507(2)
which states, "The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time
or in a different method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to
establish that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner."
However, the quoted sentence is aimed primarily at preventing excessive second guess-
ing concerning the price actually achieved in any given sale. See G. GILMORE, SECURITY IN-
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a state supreme court could reasonably adopt as an interpretation of the
U.C.C. test (if, pace the Ninth Circuit, it has not done so already). 149 Of
course, if it is meritorious, the standard might also be enacted legislatively, or
by the FTC under the authority to prevent unfair trade practices granted by
section 5 of the FTC Act.'"
If the FTC's definition of best possible price becomes the standard by
which deficiencies are assessed, enforcement of the standard will require an
answer to an empirical question: What method of sale is most likely to
minimize deficiencies and maximize surpluses? The results reported in this ar-
ticle indicate that for most recourse repossessions, and probably for most auto
repossessions in general, retail sale will be the method likely to obtain the best
possible price, even taking into account sales expenses. This finding suggests
the possibility of a hybrid standard, combining best possible price with a
presumption that the best possible price is a retail price.
Under such a hybrid standard, the creditor in a deficiency suit could rebut
the presumption that a retail disposition would have obtained the best possible
price for the property by establishing suitable facts concerning the condition of
the repossessed vehicle or unique market circumstances.' 51
 In the absence of
such evidence, the debtor would be credited with the retail value of the col-
lateral. The FTC Order in Ford Motor Co. , et al. points in the direction of a
rebuttable presumption in favor of retail sale, at least in recourse transactions.
As part of the definition of best possible price, the Commission order states
that: "For each disposition of a repossessed vehicle by respondent other than
by retail sale, respondent shall retain contemporaneous documentation show-
ing with specificity that such manner of disposition could reasonably be ex-
pected to produce a greater net return for the debtor's account than would
retail sale. "152
The results of this study lend support to a standard combining best possi-
ble price with a rebuttable presumption that retail price is the best price. Under
TERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 5 44.5 at 1237 (1st ed. 1965). By contrast, the FTC's best
possible price standard is not tied to the price actually obtained in a particular sale. Rather, it re-
quires sale in "a manner designed to obtain the best possible price." Ford Motor Co., et a!, 94
F.T.C. at 640 (emphasis added). Because it focuses on the method of sale, and not the actual
price, the FTC standard is consistent with the U.C.C. commercial reasonableness aproach.
"9 See 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1232-34 (1965).
Even the court in the Francis Ford case stated, "It may well be that Oregon courts will interpret
U.C.C. 5 9-504 in the manner advocated by the F.T.C. if the question is put to them" although
this may merely be a rhetorical flourish. 654 F.2d 599, 601.
' 50
 15 U.S.C. 5 45 (1976).
151 The burden of rebutting the presumption should be placed on the creditor because
the creditor will ordinarily have better access to the facts necessary to establish what the best
available price is than will a consumer. Courts have usually placed on creditors the burden of
establishing that a repossession sale was commercially reasonable under U.C.C. 5 9-504. J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOk OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
1122-23 (2d ed. 1980).
152 Ford Motor Co., et al, 94 F.T.C. at 639.
March 19821	 CONSUMER REPOSSESSIONS	 415
U.C.C. section 9-504 the balance owed by or to the debtor following reposses-
sion depends on how successfully the repossessing creditor sells the collateral.
This fact suggests that the creditor should have a responsibility to sell collateral
in a manner that best protects the debtor's interest, taking into account costs to
the creditor.'" The best possible price standard makes this responsibility ex-
plicit. At the same time, the results of this study indicate that retail disposition
of repossessions both is possible and reduces deficiencies, at least where
recourse arrangements are feasible. These findings suggest that, in applying a
best possible price rule, retail disposition should be the standard against which
creditor efforts should be measured. The study does not show that retail
disposition is always possible, however, so creditors should be allowed to
establish that another method of disposition is the best possible in appropriate
cases.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The automobile market is characterized by the coexistence of two very dif-
ferent methods of disposition of repossessions — wholesale sales, primarily
conducted by creditors, and retail sales, primarily conducted by dealers. In the
past, empirical studies have indicated that the U.C.C. allowed creditors to
dispose of repossessions in an inefficient manner, resulting in large deficiencies
assessed to consumers under U.C.C. section 9-504. Analysis of the new FTC
data, however, indicates that many repossessions are retailed, and that retail
disposition results in substantially smaller average deficiencies. It appears like-
ly that more repossessions could be retailed than are now, through increased
use of recourse agreements.
The efficiency with which repossessions are sold is not the only considera-
tion relevant to the evaluation of U.C.C. section 9-504 or other legal rules con-
cerning deficiencies.'" It is, however, an important consideration and has
been a major focus of policy debate.'" The results of this study, therefore, have
important policy implications. By showing that many repossessions are
marketed as effectively as other used cars, the study suggests that the right to a
"3 See state cases under the U.C.C. cited in id. at 591.
A variant of the best possible price standard would allow repossessing creditors to sell
collateral in any way they saw fit, so long as the debtor was credited with the best possible price.
If the creditor wished to sell collateral in a manner not calculated to produce the highest net
return, for example, in order to dispose of collateral quickly, it could do so. Best possible price
would then be determined based on an appraisal. This variant gives creditors greater flexibility
without, in principle, hurting debtor interests. Estimation of best possible price not based on an
actual sale, however, may raise enforcement or other practical problems.
1 " For example, a complete treatment of the deficiencies question would include a
discussion of the effect of various legal rules concerning deficiencies on delinquency rates and on
the cost of credit. See FTC CREDIT PRACTICES STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 310-15.
'" See, e.g., policy discussion in articles cited at note 5 supra; and creditor arguments
concerning their inability to sell repossessions for higher prices than they now do, described in
FTC CREDIT PRACTICES STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 296-99, 302-03.
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deficiency should not be eliminated across the board. 156
 This same finding, that
repossessions can be sold successfully in the retail market, suggests that
creditors and car dealers should be held to a higher standard than they now are
with respect to the disposition of repossessions. In particular, the finding lends
support to a requirement that creditors and dealers use methods of sale
calculated to obtain the best possible price for collateral taking into account
sales costs. The results of this study further suggest that the best possible price
usually will be a retail price.
Although this article considers policy implications of the empirical results
presented, its major purpose is to present a more complete picture of the ex-
isting system of disposition of repossessions than was previously available. This
picture shows that the market has responded to the requirements of U.C.C.
section 9-504 in two quite different ways — wholesale sale by creditors and
retail sale by car dealers. Future legislative and scholarly consideration of the
deficiencies issue should take into account both aspects of the market's
response.
' 55 As mentioned at note 122 supra, this judgment may be tempered by practical enforce-
ment considerations.
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APPENDIX
Description of FTC Data on Recourse Repossessions Excerpted
from Appendix C of the FTC Credit Practices Staff Report: 157
* * *
B. 
 Description of Data 
The data placed on the record by the rulemaking staff was a
subsample of a larger body of data obtained by the FTC Seattle of-
fice in connection with recently completed litigation.' The Seattle
data base included information obtained from over 200 General
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler dealerships, each of which had a
recourse arrangement with one of the finance subsidiaries of the par-
ent manufacturers.
The dealers from whom information was obtained by the Seat-
tle office fall into two groups. Prior to issuance of the complaint in
the relevant litigation (February 1976), material was obtained from
approximately forty dealers. Following issuance of the complaint,
material was obtained from approximately 180 additional dealers.
The post complaint dealers included all Ford and Chrysler and a
sample of GM dealers who were reported by the auto finance corn-
./ panies to be involved with over 100 repossessions on a recourse basis
during a designated one-year period. It also included a random sam-
ple of other dealers subject to repurchase or recourse agreements
who generated a substantial number (but less than 100) of reposses-
sions. A separate sampling was also drawn of dealers which did a
substantial volume of business and in which GM, Ford, or Chrysler
had an ownership interest.
Information and documents were obtained from dealers by the
Seattle Regional Office pursuant to demand letters and, in many
cases, subpoenas. A number of different letters and subpoena
specifications were used. A sampling of the demand letters and sub-
poenas has been placed on the Credit Practices rulemaking record. 8
The demand letters and subpoenas sent to different dealers
were roughly similar although they differed in detail. In virtually all
cases the information requested which is most relevant to the pro-
posed Credit Practices Rule took the following form: For all
repossessions in a designated time period in late 1974 and early 1975
which were subject to repurchase or recourse agreements with the
automobile finance subsidiaries, dealers were directed to indicate
157 FTC CREDIT PRACTICES STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, Appendix C at 2-4.
7 Chrysler Motors Corp., Dkt. 9072; Ford Motor Co., Dkt. 9073; General
Motors Corp., Dkt. 9074.
9 R-XI-167.
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the pay-off to the finance company net of rebates or credits and the
ultimate resale price. 9 For transactions where the resale price was
greater than the net pay-off amount, dealers were directed to supply
information on expenses involved in the repossession and resale,
along with information on resulting deficiencies or surpluses. In a
number of cases dealers were asked to supply expense and deficiency
information with respect to all of their repossessions. Some dealers
did this without being required to.
Out of the total Seattle Regional Office sample of over 200
dealers, material from 59 dealers has been put on the Credit Prac-
tices record. Dealers were selected from the total Seattle office
sample primarily on the basis of whether the dealer had submitted
information relevant to the Credit Practices rulemaking in compact
and legible form. Some attempt was also made to obtain diversity in
terms of geography, state laws concerning deficiencies in consumer
transactions, and size of dealership. Formal random selection pro-
cesses were not used. However, no examination of the statistical
content of the documents was made prior to or in the course of the
selection. The selection process was therefore "blind" with respect
to what the data submitted by any given dealer would demonstrate.
In order to exclude irrelevant material and to keep down the
volume of documents, not all of the documents obtained from any
given dealer have been placed on the Credit Practices record.
Generally speaking, a chart or other summary prepared by the
dealer, giving the price and expenses information described in the
previous paragraph, was placed on the record. In some instances the
summary statistics are accompanied by other documents such as ex-
planatory correspondence between a dealer and the FTC Seattle of-
fice. Certain information has been deleted from the documents that
have been put on the Credit Practices record, to protect the privacy
of individuals or businesses. This information includes names and
addresses of defaulting debtors, and, in some instances, names of
banks which have financing relationships with dealers.
9 Dealers partially owned by one of the parent auto manufacturers were
also directed to supply this information for cars financed by institutions other than
the finance subsidiaries.
